We argue that established firms, including industry incumbents and diversifying entrants, play vital and underemphasized roles as the sources of major innovations in many industries. The study presents empirical evidence showing that established firms are often sources of major innovations in the telecommunications and medical sectors. We conduct an exploratory investigation of him variation in the types of technical and market change influence whether industry incumbents, diversifying entrants or new companies are the sources of major innovations.
Introduction
This study seeks to raise the profile of established firms as sources of major innovations. Traditional perspectives on technical change often assume that new firms are more likely than established firms to be the sources of major innovations. The traditional approach has two limitations. First, research haŝ only recently begun to provide general explanations for the many cases iñ which industry incumbents introduce major innovations. Second, researcherŝ j rarely address the innovative role of diversifying entry, in which firms I introduce innovations in industries beyond their current markets. We argue that established firms, including industry incumbents and diversifying 1 entrants, play vital and underemphasized roles as the sources of major £ innovations in many industries. The study presents empirical evidence §> showing that established firms often are sources of major innovations in the o telecommunications and medical sectors. We conduct an exploratory fe investigation of how variation in the types of technical and market change 2£ influence which types of firms are the sources of major innovations.
•| Research on innovation has spawned many typologies of technical change, including references to competence-destroying and competence-enhancing change, radical and incremental change, modular and architectural change, technological paradigms, technological trajectories, innovation envelopes, and dominant designs (see Adler, 1989) . A common thread through the innovation literature is that the more changes in knowledge a new product or process needs, the greater the change the innovation requires. For ease of presentation, we will refer to innovations that require substantial new knowledge or substantial reconfiguration of existing knowledge as major innovations. This definition follows Schumpeter (1950) in assuming that major innovation often stems from recombining knowledge from previously unrelated uses. Major innovations contrast with incremental innovations, which are improvements, refinements, minor modifications, and extensions of core or complementary product and process technology that enhance the utility or reduce the cost of an existing product (Utterback and Abernathy, 1975; Abernathy and Clark, 1985) .
The Innovative Role of New and Established Firms
We begin by assessing the role of established firms in fostering new technology that leads to major changes within an existing industry or creation of entirely new industries. Scholars dating back at least as far as Schumpeter have debated the relative roles of established firms and new firms as the primary sources of major innovations. On the one hand, established firms might have a dominant innovative role owing to their financial and technical resources, coupled with valuable linkages to customers, suppliers and other constituents. On the other hand, new companies might be the most likely to identify path^breaking opportunities outside the bounds of existing practice. Schumpeter himself took both positions during his career: in Theory of Economic Development (1934) he argued that entrepreneurs in new companies were the progenitors of most major innovations, whereas in Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy (1950) he argued that large established firms with R&D facilities were the principal source of major innovations. For ease of presentation, we will divide the subsequent literature into two main streams: economic studies and behavioral studies. In recent years, both streams of research have emphasized the role of new firms as the source of major innovations.
Economic studies emphasize the effect of market concentration, potential sales cannibalization and firm size on research and development activities (Adler, 1989; Cohen and Levin, 1989) . Research is inconclusive about the impact of market concentration on R&D effort. Some studies have found a 1182 positive relationship between concentration and R&D (e.g. Scherer, 1983a) . Others found no significant relationship (Cohen et al., 1987) . The early theoretical contributions of Feller (1951) , Arrow (1962) and others focused on the disincentives for established firms to undertake major innovations, arguing that firms have economic incentives to avoid cannibalizing existing sales with major innovations. Many studies have investigated how R&D expenditures, patent output and other research activities vary with firm size (e.g. Eeinman and Fuentevilla, 1976; Scherer, 1984; Reinganum, 1985) . The most.general conclusion of the empirical studies of firm size and innovativeness is that R&D inputs tend to increase more than proportionately with firm size, but R&D outputs as measured by patents tend to increase less than proportionately with firm size (Acs and Audretsch, 1990, pp. 38-43) . The evidence on the patent output-R&D input relationship suggests either that R&D effort suffers from decreasing returns or that large firms tend to patent fewer inventions (Scherer, 1983b) . Nonetheless, Acs and Audretsch (1990) found that in many industries large firms play a significant role in innovation. In 122 of 448 industries, Acs and Audretsch (1990, p. 53) found that the large-firm innovation rate exceeded the small-firm innovation rate. Further, in another 170 industries the innovation rates of large and small firms were indistinguishable. Acs and Audretsch attribute the relative innovative advantage of large firms to industry-level factors such as capital intensity, advertising intensity and market concentration. Additional factors, though, are likely to include firm level issues such as the knowledge base that firms draw upon in the innovation process, as we discuss in the next section of the paper.
Paralleling the economic research, studies using behavioral frameworks examine the options available to firms confronted by technical change. In this research, the focus shifts somewhat from a distinction between large firms and small firms to one between industry incumbents and new entrants. Research conducted by Cooper and Schendel (1976), Foster (1986) , Tushman and Anderson (1986) and others suggests that major technical changes that affect an industry often originate in firms outside the established industry.
In searching for explanations for the inertia of established firms, researchers began to explore the innovation process and its impact on industries and firms. This stream of research examines the implications for firms of various types of technical change. distinguished between incremental and discontinuous technical change that, respectively, required firms to take a frame bending or frame breaking approach to their capabilities. Abernathy and Clark (1985) and Tushman and Anderson (1986) 1183 '• distinguished between competence-enhancing and competence-destroying technical change, arguing that innovations that decreased the value of the capabilities of industry incumbents would tend to emerge from outside the established industry. Anderson and Tushman (1990) examined the cycle of technological development from discontinuity through ferment to the emergence of a dominant design. They found that firms needed to develop heterogeneous organizational and interorganizational competencies to deal with the diverse technical, organizational and interorganizational challenges posed by these cycles. Industry incumbents often lack critical capabilities needed to address the challenges (Burgelman, 1983; Mezias and Glynn, 1993) . Henderson and Clark (1990) argued that entrants had greater economic incentives than incumbents to invest in new technology. They also suggested that organizational inertia constrains incumbents' ability to develop capabilities needed for new technologies.
Organizational inertia often stems from the routines needed to carry out business operation. Routines are identifiable patterns of activity embodied in human or capital assets (Winter, 1990) . Firms develop internal routines that allow them to perform existing tasks reliably and to accumulate knowledge (Hannan and Freeman, 1977; Argote et al., 1990; Cohen and Levinthal, 1990) . Firms also develop routines based on interorganizational relationships with customers, suppliers and other external constituents in the market (Hannan and Freeman, 1989; Baker, 1990; Fichman and Levinthal, 1991; Singh and Mitchell, 1996) . The organizational and interorganizational routines tend to localize the search patterns for new technology, even when competition or foresight causes firms to attempt to innovate (Nelson and Winter, 1982) . The political process of reallocating resources within established firms also detracts from responsiveness (Pettigrew, 1973; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1974; Mintzberg, 1983) . Consequently, managers of established firms do not observe many new opportunities or are slow to react to opportunities (Zajac and Bazerman, 1991; Leonard-Barton, 1992) . Overall, this literature suggests that established firms will find it difficult to create of adapt to innovations that require substantial changes in their organization.
In contrast to the inertia of established firms, theorists often credit new companies with substantial flexibility and responsiveness to opportunities. The reasoning flows from the obverse of the reasoning attributed to incumbents (see Eisenhardt, 1987, 1988; Bahrami and Evans, 1987) . New firms have no existing sales to cannibalize, which creates incentives to initiate change. In addition, new companies can establish new organizational routines that will allow them to initiate and exploit change.
The popular press reinforces the image of new firms as the dominant 1184 sources of major innovations with frequent stories about the latest 'High Tech, High Flyer'. Reports of successful initial public offerings led Business Week (December 18, 1995) to term the current US economy as fueled by 'IPO capitalism'. Conversely, innovation by established firms seems to garner headlines mainly when they fail. The idea that large firms can only innovate when they break themselves up into smaller units has gained wide currency, as shown by media reports surrounding the planned break-up of AT&T. The conclusion of this line of thinking is that new firms play a dominant role as the source of major innovations. Nonetheless, several contradictions arise when one considers the argument that established firms play an insignificant role as the source of major innovations. Perhaps the most basic conceptual problem is that the conclusion primarily applies in terms of average firm-level tendencies; that is, as an argument that many established firms will not initiate major innovations. We agree with this argument. Nonetheless, the argument obscures the empirical fact that some established firms play a critically important role in the innovation process by developing, sponsoring and legitimizing the adoption of new technologies (Wade, 1995) .
In order to investigate the innovative role of established firms, it is useful to consider examples of major innovation by two types of companies: industry incumbents and diversifying entrants. Industry incumbents are firms that already participate in an industry when they develop a new good or service. Diversifying entrants are established companies that enter an industry that is new to them.
Many theoretical and statistical analyses portray industry incumbents as active participants in the process of incremental innovation but minor players as sources of major innovations. In practice, though, industry incumbents are the sources of many major innovations. Anderson and Tushman (1991) found that 'veterans' often are the sources of major process innovations and dominant designs. Meth6 (1992) showed that incumbents were the sources of many major innovations in the semiconductor industry. Banbury and Mitchell (1995) found that industry incumbents were common sources of major innovations in the pacemaker industry. Many other examples arise in other industries, such as IBM and reduced instruction set computing (RISC) in the semiconductor industry, RCA and Westinghouse and the liquid crystal display (LCD) in the electronics industry, and Fujitsu-Fanuc in the development of industrial robotics (Florida and Browdy, 1991; Klepper, 1988) .
The argument that established firms rarely develop major innovations weakens further when we consider diversifying entrants. Diversifying entrants receive some mention but rarely play central roles in theoretical and empirical 1185
analyses of technical change. However, diversifying entry by established companies is the most common form of entry into most industries (Dunne et ai, 1988) , and diversifying entrants are the source of many major innovations. Many of the firms in the Cooper and Schendel (1976) multi-industry study and the Henderson and Clark (1990) photolithography study were diversifying entrants. Methe" (1992) found that diversifying entrants were key sources of major innovations in the semiconductor industry. Klepper (1988) credited a diversifying entrant as the initial source of commercial industrial robots. Other examples include Ampex in the development of broadcast VCRs (Rosenbloom and Freeze, 1985) ; Xerox in the development of icon-based and networked PCs (Smith and Alexander, 1988) ; banks in the development of ATM networks, Dornier and medical lithotripters; and RCA in the development of television networks (Brand and Emmons, 1992) . Again, established firms play critical roles as sources of major innovations. Although one might view examples of major innovations developed by industry incumbents and diversifying entrants as idiosyncratic exceptions, we believe that major innovation by established firms is more common and more systematic than we commonly recognize. Underemphasis of the innovative roles of established firms occurs for several reasons. In part, the established firms' role is obscure because their innovative activities tend to be small parts of the firms' overall activities. This means that the activities are less obvious than in the case of new firms, for which the innovative activities may be the sole activities. Moreover, financial analysts, who provide much of the public information about firms' innovative activities, have less incentive to follow individual innovation projects of established firms because a single project offers less potential for corporate financial growth than in the case of new companies. In addition, established firms' failures tend to involve more people and money than the failures of new firms, so that academic and popular attention often focuses on cases in which large firms fail rather than on cases in which they succeed. A further reason why the role of established firms in supporting and initiating innovation is underemphasized is that firms that are critically important to the generation of successful new technology often do not benefit commercially themselves. Although innovative established companies sometimes become strong players in the market for the goods incorporating the new technology, later entrants very often become the most successful commercially. The later entrants may be large firms that come closer to fitting the popular perception of established firms as imitators (Davies, 1979) . In other cases, the firms that benefit from the initial technical activity are small firms founded by employees of the initiating firm or 1186 = entering in response to growing market opportunities created by the initiating firm. The early innovative role of the established firms either often never becomes widely apparent or is quickly forgotten. So far, our argument stresses that established firms are important sources of major innovations We do not wish to understate the critically important role of new firms. Rather, our goal is to raise the profile of an underemphasized part of the innovation process. To further investigate whether established firms are important sources of major innovations, we determined the firms that introduced several major innovations in the telecommunications and medical sectors from the 1950s to the 1980s.
Sources of Major Innovations in the Telecommunications and Medical Sectors
We chose the telecommunications and medical sectors for several reasons: the sectors are sufficiently different to provide breadth to the study; there have been frequent important innovations in the industries; moreover, the sectors provide detailed data for archival research. We identified major innovations from an examination of the technical and business press and verified these through discussions with industry participants. We used an extensive review of business and government publications to identify the first five firms to introduce each of the major innovations. Our primary assumption is that the earliest firms to introduce new goods or services are the primary sources of the innovations or, at least, were integrally involved in developing the innovation. The analysis distinguishes between new product markets and major innovation within existing product markets. A new product market is a product or service that provides a new function. An example from the telecommunications sample is satellite communications. Quite simply, until someone launched a satellite into space and beamed communications signals to and from it, no such function existed. We define a major innovation within an existing product market as the introduction of a product into a market for which some currently existing product provides a similar function. The new product may provide the same funaion as well as new functions. An example from the medical devices sample is the introduction of multidimensional B-scan and then M-scan ultrasound devices, which followed the introduction of unidirectional A-scan ultrasound devices. Both products provided new functions for the already existing ultrasound devices in the market. Comparing new product markets and major innovation within product markets helps investigate the sources of major innovations in different contexts. '• 1187 Table 1 summarizes entry by new companies and established firms into 12new telecommunication and medical device product markets. For this table we define an established firm as an existing company that diversified into the product market; that is, a diversifying entrant. We define a new company as a company founded in order to enter the product market. We examined six new product markets in the telecommunications area and six in the medical devices area. We recorded entry based on year of entry, counting as ties firms that entered during the same year. We report statistics for both the first entrant and the first five entrants in each productmarket. The dual listing reduces any concern about entry timing ambiguity and addresses the possibility that the first entrants might be responding quickly to products being developed by other firms. We believe that entry by the first five firms provides a long enough window to address these issues. Table 1 depicts the frequency with which established firms, in the form of diversifying entrants, were the sources of major innovations in the telecommunications and medical sectors. Overall, established firms accounted for 63% of the first entrants and 74% of the first five entrants in the 12 product markets, with similar proportions in both sectors. The results illustrate the importance of established firms as sources of innovations that initiated product markets within the telecommunications and medical device sectors. Table 2 summarizes the sources of 17 major innovations within established medical device product markets. We compare entry by industry incumbents, diversifying entrants and new companies. Again, we examined which type of firm was the first entrant into the product market and also identified the first five entrants. Table 2 indicates the frequency with which established firms are the sources of major innovations in the established product markets. Taken as a whole, established firms account for more than two-thirds (68%) of the first entrants and almost three-quarters (73%) of the first five entrants. When we divide the established firm category into incumbents and diversifying entrants, the innovative role of the industry incumbents becomes particularly clear. Industry incumbents account for almost half of the early entrants, including 47% of the first entrants and 44% of the first five entrants. Although new companies are common early entrants, industry incumbents and diversifying entrants clearly play critical roles as major innovators.
Major Innovation within Established Product Markets
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The results in this section reinforce our argument that established companies are important sources of major innovations. In the next section we outline factors that we expect to influence whether established firms or new companies tend to be the sources of major innovations.
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Factors Affecting Major Innovation by Established Firms
We believe that the issues affecting innovation by established firms can best be understood by examining factors that create the conditions that favor one type of firm's entry over another. The ongoing debate on whether start-ups or incumbents are more innovative would be better understood if recast in terms of what conditions favor new companies, diversifying entrants or incumbents. We consider two general sets of factors: the type of technical change required to undertake an innovation arid the impact that the innovation will have on current markets. The type of technical change is important because it will affect the type of knowledge a firm requires in order to innovate. The type of market change is important because a new product must attract customers. We also discuss competitive influences following the discussion of technical and market change.
We develop a simple typology of technical and market change. Within technical change, we distinguish between reconfiguration of existing knowledge bases and the creation of new knowledge bases. By knowledge base we mean the research and development, production and marketing skills required to commercialize an innovation. Innovations that require reconfiguration of a firm's existing knowledge base would encompass both the modular and architectural types of innovation discussed by Henderson and Clark (1990, pp. 10-12) . Within market change, we distinguish between innovations that substitute for existing goods and services, innovations that complement existing goods and services, and innovations that create hew markets. We argue that variation along the technical and market dimensions will affect which types of firms are the sources of major innovations.
We start with a framework that is consistent with the dominant themes of existing arguments concerning the impact of technical arid market change on the sources of innovation. The empirical study addresses innovations which result in new products or services rather than innovations in processes for existing products or services, but the logic of the discussion applies to both product and process innovation. In the following section of the paper, we will report empirical results classified according to the framework. The results show partial consistency with traditional expectations, along with some key differences. We then use the combination of the theoretical perspectives and the empirical results to develop implications for continuing research. Table 3 summarizes the initial framework.
We first consider the technical change dimension of Table 3 . The common argument is that new companies will be the source of most innovations that require substantial new knowledge. The logic stems from the behavioral research related to the concept of routines (see Nelson and Winter, 1982;  Hannan and Freeman, 1989; Singh and Mitchell, 1996) . Routines are costly and difficult to create. Once firms have created routines, changing routines is both costly and subject to organizational resistance. New knowledge bases require the creation of new routines, so that established firms may have to bear the costs of disrupting established routines and will often have to overcome organizational resistance to change. New companies bear only the cost of establishing the new routines. To the extent that financial capital isavailable, new firms will be more likely to develop the routines needed to create and use the new knowledge. In contrast to new knowledge bases, established firms will be common sources of innovation when innovations require reconfiguration of existing knowledge bases. Firms can often reconfigure existing knowledge bases by using existing organizational routines, so that established firms have both behavioral and economic incentives to pursue innovative opportunities. Moreover, established firms will be the most common repositories of much of the reconfigurable knowledge, which often provides the impetus for innovative activity by the firms (Henderson and Clark, 1990; Leonard-Barton, 1992) .
The vertical dimension of Table 3 reflects the common argument concerning the types of firms that will be sources of innovations requiring new or reconfigured knowledge. As we noted earlier, though, a limit of this argument is that it applies to average firm-level tendencies. That is, the strongest argument is that most established firms will be unlikely to introduce innovations requiring substantial new knowledge. The argument is weaker at 1192 the level of the innovation in the sense that outliers among established firms might well be common. Although existing routines might bind most established firms, a few firms in any industry might well be willing and able to invest time and money in exploring new knowledge. Financial incentives or simply research curiosity to carry out exploratory experiments might drive the investment. Also, as we noted earlier, such early experiments often fail in the market. If such failures quickly disappear from sight and memory, then established firms might be more common sources of innovations involving substantial new knowledge than we commonly recognize. Cases in which incumbents are sources of innovations requiring substantial new knowledge might well be most common in innovations involving substitute uses. As we discuss below, the traditional argument suggests that many incumbents will avoid substitute innovation. However, those incumbents that do undertake innovation requiring new knowledge will often focus on substitute goods and services, which involve local search in the sense of their existing market even if the innovations require distant search for new technical knowledge. Therefore, we add incumbents as possible sources of substitute innovations that require substantial new knowledge.
We now turn to the market change dimension of Table 3 , addressing substitute innovations, complementary innovations and innovations that create new product markets. The common argument regarding innovations that substitute for existing products is that incumbents have strong incentives to avoid cannibalizing sales of their existing product lines. As we noted earlier, several studies argue that incumbents will tend to avoid innovations that would reduce the value of existing assets, including both organizational and physical assets (see Arrow, 1962; Abernathy and Clark, 1985; Henderson and Clark, 1990) . Instead, this research suggests that new companies and diversifying entrants will be common sources of major innovations that substitute for existing goods and services. Substitutes may provide opportunities for new companies and diversifying entrants to enter an established market. This result has not only found support in empirical studies (Tushinan and Anderson, 1986; Henderson and Clark, 1990 ) but has also been derived in theoretical models of product cannibalization (see Reinganum, 1985; Conner, 1988) . Coupled with the previous discussion of technical change, therefore, this research stream suggests that new companies will be common sources of substitute innovations that require substantial new knowledge and diversifying entrants will be common sources of substitute innovations that require knowledge reconfiguration. Consistent with our discussion above, though, we add incumbents as possible sources of substitute innovations. This may seem to run counter to empirical observation but, 1193 again, incumbents might often be forgotten sources if after-the-face empirical observations tend to omit failed innovations. Innovations involving complementary uses have received less attention than substitutes in traditional analyses, but several arguments are relevant. We define complementary goods as those goods that together make up a system. As an example, Intel makes microprocessors, motherboards on which microprocessors are mounted and personal computers in which motherboards are installed. Each product cannot function alone and often innovation in one stimulates innovation in the others. Intel is an incumbent in all three industries, making complementary products. As a further example, a personal computer and a laser printer make up a system. If a company making personal computers also decides to make laser printers, then it is producing a complementary product. An incumbent in the case of complementary goods is a company that is making any of the various parts of the system. All three types of firms have incentives and opportunities to develop complementary products. Incumbents may gain economies of scope from existing assets by developing complementary goods and services. Search routines also tend to localize around current markets and technologies, which would create opportunities for innovation by industry incumbents, especially in cases involving knowledge reconfiguration. Consistent with the earlier discussion of technical change, new companies might tend to be the sources of complementary innovations that require substantial new knowledge. Thus, incumbents and new companies might be common sources of complementary innovations. However, complementary innovations also offer competitive incentives for diversifying entrants, especially in the case of knowledge reconfiguration. A diversifying entrant would be a company entering from an unrelated industry, such as an aerospace company entering the personal computer or printer markets with an innovation. Such firms would have fewer opportunities to gain scope economies, relative to incumbents. At the same time, however, complementary innovation may provide a means of entering an industry without competing directly with incumbents. Thus, diversifying entrants also might be common sources of complementary innovations.
Finally, we turn to innovations involving substantial new uses, which create new product markets rather than substitute for or complement existing products. Industry incumbents are not relevant to this category of innovation, because the innovations create new industries. We expect new companies to be common initiators of new product markets requiring substantial new knowledge, while diversifying entrants will be common sources in cases involving knowledge reconfiguration.
' In summary, we expect variation in technical change and market change to 1194
influence the types of firms that are the sources of major innovations. We stress that our approach permits multiple influences to act simultaneously, so that different types of firms will sometimes be sources of similar innovations. We believe that this breadth is a strength of the approach because it is consistent with the empirical outcome in many industries. Other factors will also influence which types of firms are the sources of major innovations. Acs and Audretsch (1987) , Dorfman (1988) and others have argued that industry conditions may influence the relative contribution towards innovation of types of firms. For instance, industry incumbents face strong incentives to innovate when they face substantial current or potential competition (Mitchell, 1989) , because the threat of losing sales to other firms outweighs the disincentives of cannibalization. Despite the importance of other factors, the technical and market change factors warrant investigation. Moreover, the technical and market change factors will tend to influence how strongly other factors, such as competitiveness, affect established firms. For instance, industry incumbents will often be better able to respond to competitive pressure involving substitute products when innovation requires the reconfiguration of existing knowledge rather than creation of new knowledge.
We use the data from the telecommunications and medical sectors to conduct an exploratory investigation of how technical and market change influences the sources of major innovations. The purpose of this empirical analysis is to help develop an understanding of the innovative role of different types of firms, rather than to provide a conclusive test of predictions. Table 4 reports the first firms to introduce the major medical and telecommunications innovations that we listed earlier, based on variation in market change and technical change. The market change classification denotes whether the innovation substituted for existing goods, complemented existing goods or created a new use. The technical change classification denotes whether the innovation required substantial new knowledge. We assigned values for the classifications based on discussions with industry participants. The numbers reported in bold type are the types of firms predicted in Table 3 to be common sources of major innovations relevant to each cell of Table 4 .
Empirical Analysis of Market and Technical Change
Several aspects of Table 4 are noteworthy. First, on the technical change dimension, new companies are common sources of innovations requiring new knowledge bases, while established firms are more common in cases involving The figures reported in bold italic type are the types of firms predicted in Table 3 to be common sources of major innovations relevant to each cell of the table.
reconfiguration. Nonetheless, new companies also appear in several reconfiguration cases and established companies appear in several cases involving new knowledge. Second, on the market change dimension, diversifying entrants were common sources of substitute products involving reconfigured knowledge. Incumbents also were common sources of major innovation involving reconfigured knowledge for substitute products-a point that we will return to later in the paper. Third, diversifying entrants were common sources of complementary innovations involving knowledge reconfiguration. Unexpectedly, new companies also were common sources of complementary innovations involving knowledge reconfiguration. Fourth, in the new use category, new companies were more common than diversifying entrants in the new knowledge base cell, while diversifying entrants were more common in the reconfiguration cell. One must interpret the comparisons cautiously becasue of the small sample and broad measures, but the implications are intriguing.
We also used binomial logistic regression (Yamaguchi, 1991) to estimate the influence of market and technical change on the likelihood that new companies, diversifying entrants and incumbents would be the sources of major innovations. The logistic regression modeb took the form ln(P;/(l -P,)) = (X + PX. In this equation, P,is the probability that a firm of type / would be the first entrant into a new industry or subfield. The log odds of the probability is held to be linearly affected by a matrix of covariates X with coefficient vector P and intercept a. The effect of a oneunit change of covariate j on the probability of a firm of type / being the source of a major innovation is PyPXl -Pi). We used the SAS statistical package to obtain the maximum likelihood estimates. The logistic regression procedure allows us to verify and summarize the interpretation of the contingency tables.
We analyzed three binary logit models. Each logit model compared one type of entrant with the other two types of entrants (new companies, diversifying entrants, incumbents). Thus, the 0-1 dependent variable for each equation denoted whether the first entrant to a new product market or new product class within an existing product market was the specified type of firm. The covariates included dummy variables for market and technical change. The market change variables denoted whether the innovation substituted for existing goods, complemented existing goods or created a new use. The technical change variable denoted whether the innovation required creation of substantial new knowledge. We did not investigate the interaction of market and technical change in the regression analysis becasue of the sample size. The analysis of incumbents includes only the major innovations within existing product markets. Table 5 reports the results of the regression analysis.
The results reported in Table 5 are consistent with our earlier discussion. New companies are particularly likely to be first entrants when an innovation requires new knowledge bases. This result supports the argument that new companies are more likely than established firms to be able to create the new routines needed to adapt to fundamentally new knowledge. By contrast, according to this logic, established companies are particularly likely to undertake major innovation that requires reconfiguration of existing knowledge bases. The market change results, consistent with the cross-tabulation in Table 4 , show that incumbents were especially likely to be the sources of innovations that substituted for existing uses. Conversely, new companies were particularly unlikely to be the sources of substitutes.
We conducted several sensitivity analyses of the regression estimates. We found that the reported results were robust to the addition of variables •P < 0.10, **P < 0.05 (one-tailed tests).
denoting entry year, telecommunications versus the medical industrial sector, service versus manufactured-goods innovations, and new product markets versus major innovations within product markets. We also found similar results in linear regression estimates that specified the dependent variable as the proportion of each type of firm among the first five entrants.
The empirical results are consistent with several aspects of the initial framework outlined in Table 3 . Diversifying entrants were common sources of substitute products that required knowledge reconfiguration. Diversifying entrants were common sources of complementary innovations that required knowledge reconfiguration. New companies were common sources of newuse products that required new knowledge bases. Diversifying entrants were common sources of new-use products that required knowledge reconfiguration.
At the same time, though, there are two major contradictions between the initial framework in Table 3 and the empirical results in Tables 4 and 5 . First, incumbents were the sources of many innovations that substituted for existing goods. Second, new firms were the sources of many complementary products that involved knowledge reconfiguration. In the next section, we explore the anomalies in more detail. 1198
Implications for Future Research
The two contradictions between the initial framework and the empirical results suggest intriguing implications for continuing research. The market change results in Tables 4 and 5 raise the question of why incumbents often are the sources of substitute products. One possible explanation for the results is that high technical and market uncertainty for innovations mean that it is often unclear whether a new good will substitute for an existing good or create complementary or new uses. In such cases, incumbents might introduce new goods that they expect to create new or complementary uses but which actually turn out to be substitutes. A more likely explanation for the results, though, is that incumbents are more proactive with substitutes than they are sometimes credited as being. As we noted earlier, the effect of competition might be at play as incumbents attempt to pre-empt rivals. Moreover, the fact that incumbents are often embedded in a web of relationships with buyers, suppliers and competitors will often assist the incumbents. Much of the work that has examined the spill-over effects of innovations (Jewkes et at., 1958; von Hippel, 1988) has shown that many innovative ideas originated with customers and suppliers. Similarly, Mettie" (1985 showed that supplier and customer relationships contributed to the rise of Japanese semiconductor firms in the 1980s. Not only are these partners sources of ideas for innovations, but innovation by one of the partners may also necessitate innovation in an incumbent firm. The foresight that some incumbents gain through prior experience with the technology, market and other firms may allow them to make early judgements about innovative opportunities. The lack of incumbent firms in the case of complementary innovations might suggest that there were few economies of scope available. In order to understand why this situation might result, we can re-examine the Intel example cited earlier in the paper. In the example, we suggested that innovating in microprocessors, motherboards and PCs may provide economies of scope for Intel. However, each of the goods falls within a different product market, with its own set of suppliers, customers, competitors and technology. In learning and managing these diverse industries, incumbents may tend to incur costs that lessen the advantage gained from scope economies.
In addition, complementary innovations tend to create fewer competitive threats for incumbents than do substitute innovations. As in the case of substitutes, incumbents may be aware of potential entrants for complementary goods but may expect to gain from overall increased demand if another firm successfully introduces a complementary product, without taking the risk of unsuccessful innovation or incurring the costs involved by managing in diverse markets. The importance of the incumbent carrying out 1199 the innovation lessens further because, unlike the case of substitutes, the incumbent does not lose a market to the efforts of the entering firm. Therefore, incumbents may welcome entry by other firms in order to take advantage of innovation in complementary goods. (Kogut et al., 1995) . As we noted earlier, the incentives of the entrant may be higher in the case of complementary goods than in the case of substitute goods. For the industry entrant, complementary goods avoid direct competition with an entrenched competitor. Also, entrants may have opportunities to ally with incumbents, which would allow an entrant to gain access to complementary assets and to learn about the industry it has just entered (Freeman, 1990 ).
Conclusion
Our empirical analyses show that established firms are frequent sources of major innovations in the telecommunications and medical sectors. This role tends to vary depending upon the change in technical and market factors. The innovator is more likely to be a new company than an established firm when innovation requires a new knowledge base. Although the results are only suggestive, there is some indication that new companies and diversifying entrants often try to avoid competing head-on with incumbents and, instead, introduce goods that complement existing goods or which create new uses. In contrast, counter to traditional predictions, incumbents often introduce innovations involving substitute uses. Why is the role of established firms as common sources of major innovation often underemphasized? At least three factors seem relevant in addressing this question. First, although some incumbents may be early innovators, many incumbents are not. As a result, the average tendency toward lethargy is the most obvious. Second, discussion of innovation often focuses on cases involving the creation of substantial hew knowledge bases, which are particularly likely to involve new companies. By contrast, major innovations that stem from reconfiguring existing knowledge bases, in which established firms appear to play critical roles, receive much less attention. This lack of attention is unfortunate because reconfiguration often creates fundamental shifts in technology and markets. Third, many established firms fail in the market even though they are among the earliest to introduce an innovation. The forces of change unleashed by a new technology often create needs for new skills and push markets in unforeseen directions. These changes often overwhelm the originating firms, which leave the market. Time and our own perceptions of success then tend to create survival biases that cause us to lose 1200 sight of the first firms to bring about an innovation. These issues provide a base for continued analysis.
